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Foreword: Fiduciary Duties-The Search for Content
A. A. SOMMER, JR.*
At a recent conference on corporate governance sponsored by the
American Law Institute, Professor Stanley A. Kaplan of the University of Chicago Law School stated that "fiduciary duty" was "a
concept in search of content." This recalls Justice Frankfurter's
celebrated remark that "[tlo say that a man is a fiduciary only
begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he
a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what
respect has he failed to discharge those obligations? And what are
the consequences of his deviation from duty?"'
Concern with "fiduciary duty" is steadily expanding. Where the
principal focus of this concern once was the trustee-beneficiary relationship in a conventional trust, the enhanced role of pension trusts,
the growth of investment companies, the increased concern with
corporations and their governance, and developments in the securities industry, have all combined to compel analyses of the term in
the contexts of many relationships.
The concept has been steadily maturing and expanding under the
aegis of both federal and state law, and although still amorphous in
many settings, it has been steadily acquiring the elusive content to
which Professor Kaplan adverts. Indicative of the broad relevance
of the concept are the studies commissioned by the Twentieth Century Fund concerning the correlative of fiduciary duty, conflicts of
interest. The seven booklets resulting from those investigations discuss conflicts of interest with respect to broker-dealer firms, investment banking, state and local pension fund asset management, nonprofit institutions, union pension fund asset management, commercial bank trust departments, and nonprofit institutions. While the
fundamental concept is the same in each context, the manner in
which fiduciary duty is tested in each has a uniqueness that justifies
separate consideration.
As our institutions have become larger and more complex, so have
grown the ramifications of fiduciary duty, the subtleties of conflicts
of interest, the temptations to evade responsibilities, and the difficulties of perceiving clear answers in specific situations. In his pre* Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. A.B., University of Notre Dame,
1948; LL.B. Harvard University, 1950; Commissioner, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1973-1976.
1. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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face to the essays, Professor Roy A. Schotland, chairman of the
steering committee of the Twentieth Century Fund Study, has suggested the problems that occur in a single type of institution, a
commercial bank. He asks, "How does the trust department vote
proxies, especially if the stock is in a corporation which is a significant customer of the bank's commercial department? How does a
bank regulate the flow of information it secures, in its capacity as
creditor, about customers whose stock may be held in the trust
department? How does a trust department allocate its information
and attention among its hundreds or even thousands of accounts,
some vastly larger and belonging to more 'important' clients than
2
others?"
Problems of fiduciary responsibility are nowhere more evident or
complex than in the areas of securities and corporations. In these
fields the implications of these duties are being arduously, and
sometimes painfully, worked out. Hence, it is well that this symposium focuses in this direction. With respect to the responsibility of
the individual trustee, the law is reasonably well articulated, understood, and applied. However, where we have institutional frameworks with multiple functions and activities-the commercial bank
combining trust and banking functions, the investment banker
combining underwriting functions with agency activity-the problems multiply and trouble both the principals and their advisers.
The renewed sensitivity to fiduciary standards is the consequence
of many factors, the most pressing of which has been the growth of
managed wealth. More and more of the capital resources of the
nation are being managed by persons other than those entitled to
the benefits of the wealth. This has been true of the wealth clustered
in corporations for some time; this phenomenon was well described
forty-five years ago in the classic work of Berle and Means, The
Modern CorporationandPrivateProperty.3 In recent years, the fastest accretion of wealth under professional management has probably been in pension funds; this has been so significant that Peter
Drucker asserts that these pension funds are well on their way to
controlling American corporations.'
Adherence to and enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities is critical to a society such as ours in which private accumulation and
private commitment of resources is essential. Not everyone with
2. J. BROOKS, CONLICTS OF INT.REST: CORPORATE PENSION FUND Asser MANAGEMENT Xiii
(1975).
3. A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Rev. ed.
1967).

4.

P.

DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUrION

(1976).
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investable resources is able to manage them directly; recent experience in the stock market has demonstrated this to increasing numbers of people. However, without the expectation, based upon experience and the enforceability of fiduciary mandates, that fiduciaries
may be relied upon to put their beneficiaries ahead of themselves,
the possessors of wealth would be unwilling to commit it to others
for management. Such reticence would lead to a relatively inefficient allocation of those resources, with resulting detriments to society as a whole. Consequently, the refinement, the articulation and
the development of the concepts of fiduciary responsibility, and
confidence in those concepts, are critical for our society. Thus this
law journal, by focusing upon that problem in our society, is indeed
in a mainstream of current concern. It is fitting that this symposium
focuses mainly upon the area in which statutory change has most
recently compelled concern with the problem of fiduciaries and the
area to which the most attention is now being paid, albeit without
any new legislation.
ERISA has opened up many frightening vistas. It has swept many
into the statutorily defined category of "fiduciary"; more than that,
it has created a whole host of new interpretive problems and has
exposed those within this newly defined term to liabilities enforceable in federal courts. The problem of the "directed trustee," of
which Messrs. Heald and Mulhern write, is by no means the central
one in this area, although the perils are indeed real for those described by that term. As one peruses the article of Messrs. Heald
and Mulhern, one cannot help but be bewildered by the shortcomings, ambiguities, and sheer ineptness of legislation that was some
eleven years aborning. One might have expected these problems in
legislation conceived in an emotional storm and hastily adopted;
one would not expect it in legislation that was considered with such
ostensible thoroughness and care for so long a time. The experience
with ERISA suggests that perhaps such legislation should provide
for a mandatory reexamination of operations under it within, for
example, three years after its effective date. Given such a safeguard,
poor judgment and drafting errors more likely would be discovered
and corrected. Fortunately, the scope and importance of ERISA
have been such that reexamination is now being conducted. Hopefully the problem of the "directed trustee," as well as other problems, will be solved in the course of this review.
The renewed cries for greater corporate accountability and enhanced corporate responsibility, which were mounting in urgency
even before the disclosure of illegal political contributions and improper payments overseas, have risen to a shrill level as a result of
these disclosures. These problems are clearly high on the priority list
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of the SEC; in a single week three of the five Commissioners were
reported as having addressed the problem in public utterances.' At
the heart of these discussions are the responsibilities of directors.
The Council of the American Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law recently approved a Guidebook for
Corporate Directors' which deals extensively with directors' fiduciary responsibilities. The Business Roundtable, a prestigous group
of businessmen, also has spoken on this question recently. 7
Two of the main articles in this symposium deal frontally with the
problems of directors as fiduciaries, a third somewhat peripherally
by considering the use of investment company assets to pay for
marketing expenses.
Mr. Hahn's and Ms. Manzoni's discussion of a "monitoring committee" of the board of directors which would have unique responsibilities for compliance with federal securities laws is interesting. It
seems to be based on a belief that outside directors often have been
the victims of SEC assault and that something must be done to
deflect the fire. The fact is that, although the rhetoric from the
Commission has been abundant, the Commission has not dealt
harshly with outside directors. One recalls the actions against three
outside directors of the Penn Central Company8 and the action
against outside directors in SEC v. Shiell.9 There have been settlements including section 21(a) statements in matters involving Stirling Homex Corporation,' 0 Gould, Inc.,' and, most recently, National Telephone Company, Inc.'" These exhaust the memory of
5. Address by John Evans entitled "Corporate Checks and Balances" before the Middle
Atlantic Region, American Society of Corporate Secretaries (Jan. 11, 1978); address by Roberta Karmel entitled "Politics of Change in the Composition and Structure of Corporate
Boards" before the Middle Atlantic Region, American Society of Corporate Secretaries (Jan.
11, 1978); address by Harold Williams entitled "Corporate Accountability" before the Fifth
Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 18, 1978).
6. An earlier version of this guidebook appeared as the product of the Subcommittee on
Functions and Responsibilities of Directors, of the Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law-American Bar Association, CorporateDirector's
Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976).
7. Statement of the Business Roundtable: The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation (1978).
8. SEC v. Penn Central Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH)
94,527 (complaint filed May 2, 1974).
9. [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 383, A-8 (Dec. 22, 1976).
10. Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating to
Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fan. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219.
11. In the Matter of Gould, Inc., reported in connection with SEC v. Gould, Inc. (D.D.C.
1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,077 (June 9, 1977).
12. SEC Release No. 34-14380, [1978] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 439, A-6 (Feb. 8,
1978).
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cases in which the Commission has moved against outside directors
as such with any vigor. True, many settlements in cases alleging
mismanagement and misconduct involve the imposition of additional responsibilities on outside directors, but they have not involved charges that the outside directors previously had been guilty
of misconduct.
A device such as a monitoring committee which, according to the
authors, might at once lessen the exposure of inside directors, increase that of some outside members-the monitoring committee-and lessen that of the other outside directors, is a dubious
solution to a difficult problem. It is questionable whether currently
inside directors are truly quasi-guarantors of the accuracy of SECfiled documents; the delegation of a prime responsibility for such
documents to outside directors is also highly questionable. Given
the litigiousness of the times, persuading outside directors to assume the responsibility the authors outline for members of the
"monitoring" committee would require the forensic skills of a Billy
Graham. Heaven knows outside directors are nervous enough now
about their responsibilities, particularly when they serve on the
audit committee; a request that some of them take on a burden such
as membership on the monitoring committee would unquestionably
meet with sharp rebuff.
Further, it is highly uncertain whether such a committee would
afford much protection to the other members of the board, especially with respect to 1933 Act registration statements. At a recent
institute sponsored by the University of California at San Diego, a
group of experienced securities practitioners agreed that delegation
to a committee of responsibility to review a registration statement
would not relieve the other directors of their due diligence responsibilities.
The current dialogue concerning directors and their duties has
focused almost entirely on outside directors. This almost seems to
suggest that inside directors cannot be expected to satisfy their
fiduciary responsibilities as directors in any meaningful way. I
would suggest that this may be visiting a distinct injustice upon a
large number of such people. It must be remembered that inside
directors are subject to the same standards, such as duties of care
and loyalty, as outside directors; in some contexts, notably 1933 Act
registration statements, the degree of diligence imposed upon them
may be heavier. It may well be that more investigation of the manner in which inside directors perform is warranted; they may be
better than they are given credit for.
Mr. Goldberg's discussion of the possibility of replacing some of
the regulatory restraints on investment companies with greater reli-
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ance on "independent directors" is an interesting and timely one.
There has been a growing impatience with the minutiae of regulation of investment companies. Recently, SEC Chairman Roderick
M. Hills indicated a hope that the burden of regulation perhaps
could be reduced. Former Director of the Investment Management
Division, Anne Jones, voiced a similar hope. To date little seems to
have followed except a trifling relaxation of the restrictions on advertising. 13
It is indeed time to explore the possibility that disclosure combined with a heightened sense of responsibility on the part of outside
directors might be effective enough to replace some of the regulatory
restraints. Tannenbaum v. Zeller" and Lasker v. Burks 5 indicate
that the crucial factor in assessing the validity of action by independent directors is not what such directors are called, but the reality
of their independence. If these cases result in modes of selection and
patterns of conduct that truly evidence independence, then it finally
may be possible to cut through the regulatory maze that surrounds
investment companies.
The Reporter of the American Law Institute Federal Securities
Code tried to do precisely that with respect to transactions under
section 17 of the 1940 Act, which presently requires prior Commission approval. His consultants and advisers were so split on the
issue, however, that the current draft, which presumably will be the
one finally approved by the membership of the Institute, retains the
section 17 requirement virtually unchanged.
This is regrettable. When the 1940 Act was formulated and
adopted there were many questionable practices among investment
company advisers. Judging by some recent cases, these practices
continue, although at this time they seem subtler and less blatant,
and mostly cluster around commission problems. Still, the temper
of the times is different, and "it may well be that at least the need
for prior administrative sanction for many transactions that are
routine and unexceptionable should be reexamined. Reliance upon
truly independent directors just may be the answer.
Related to this, of course, is the problem Professor Freeman discusses so well-the use of fund assets to pay marketing expenses.
His analysis is probing and perceptive. It is interesting to juxtapose
the proposal of Mr. Goldberg with respect to greater reliance on the
outside directors of investment companies with the problem dis13.
(Jan.
14.
15.

SEC Release No. 33-5899; IC-10096, [1978] SEc. Ro. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 437, E-1
25, 1978).
552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
No. 77-7060, 46 U.S.L.W. 2388 (2d Cir., decided Jan. 11, 1978).
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cussed by Professor Freeman. This may well be an area in which the
Commission might forego attempts at regulation (thus far, as Professor Freeman pointedly indicates, this effort has been characterized by uncertainty and confusion) and leave it to the judgment of
independent directors who hopefully would decide it in the light of
business judgment and their perception of their fiduciary responsibility to fund shareholders.
"Fiduciary responsibility" is something of a half-way house between a legal requirement and an ethical standard. It resembles the
former since a violation of it entails legal penalties and consequences; it resembles the latter because it is articulated in general
terms, embraces a wide variety of conduct, and defies efforts at
specification. An example of the difficulty of definition was seen
when the SEC unsuccessfully tried to delineate the responsibilities
of directors under the federal securities laws."6 It is seen further in
the generality of the language in which directors' duties are typically expressed in corporation laws, e.g., section 35 of the Model
Business Corporation Act.
The ways in which one may place his interests before the interests
of those to whom he owes a fiduciary responsibility are all but limitless; hence, an effort to delineate with particularity the specifics of
that duty would truly be, in the words of Stanley Sporkin, Director
of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, a "roadmap for fraud." The
shadowy limits of this responsibility may be frustrating, especially
in our complex financial society with its multiplying relationships.
Yet it is only fitting that the concept be constantly searching for
content; the alternative would be an ossification that would destroy
its value. Its very flexibility, the recurring need to infuse it anew
with content, is its strength and the source of its relevance.
The articles in this symposium advance understanding of this
important concept. They do not exhaust the inquiries that might
cluster around it, but they do contribute to the understanding of it.
16. Address by Ray Garrett entitled "Corporate Directors and the Federal Securities
Laws," 13th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Northwestern University School of Law
(October 3, 1974).

